Last updated 2026-07-22

AI Content Transparency: The State of Play

Which marking methods AI providers use, how platforms handle them, and what tools exist to check content — for images, video, and audio, not text. The framework of marking techniques follows the EU Code of Practice on the transparency of AI-generated content, grounded here in the technologies actually deployed today. Based on public information, with sources linked throughout.

None of this tells you whether the content is true — whether what it shows actually happened, or represents reality accurately. These are provenance measures: when they work, they show how a piece of content was produced — and, sometimes, by whom.

Methods

Marking techniques

Each technique marks or records content in a different way — with different reliability, and different ways to defeat it.

Metadata

A record attached to the file: who made it, with which tool, and when. It can be cryptographically signed or unsigned.

Reliability
Signed: a valid and trusted signature is reliable evidence. Unsigned: anyone can edit it.
Limitations
Removed by screenshots, re-encoding, and upload to most social platforms.
Examples
C2PA Content Credentials (signed); SEAL (signed); IPTC photo metadata (unsigned); China's AIGC tag (unsigned; GB 45438-2025)

Invisible watermark

A pattern embedded in the pixels or audio itself, imperceptible to people. It can be secret-key (only the provider's tool can read it) or open (anyone can read it with a published decoder).

Reliability
Secret-key: reliable when the provider's tool finds it. Open: anyone can embed one, so a read is a pointer to a registry — trust comes from the signed record it looks up.
Limitations
Secret-key: verification only through the provider. Open: public tools can forge or remove it. Removal attacks exist for both.
Examples
Google's SynthID; Meta's Content Seal; Amazon's Titan watermark; Adobe's TrustMark

Fingerprinting & logging

The provider computes a fingerprint — a compact perceptual hash of the content, not a copy of it — and keeps a record, so content can be matched back later even without metadata.

Reliability
A match is the provider's own record of generation.
Limitations
Only the provider can run the lookup.
Examples
Adobe Content Authenticity; OpenAI's Sora internal reverse search

Perceptible marks

A mark placed on the content itself at generation — a logo burned into the corner of an image or video, or an audible tone or spoken disclaimer at the start of a clip.

Reliability
Perceptible to anyone, without tools.
Limitations
Can be cropped or trimmed out, or added to any content with simple editing; several services remove them on paid plans.
Examples
Gemini's corner mark (removed only on the Ultra tier and via AI Studio/API)

Forensic detection

Estimating whether content is AI-generated from statistical patterns that the generation process leaves in the content — no embedded signal involved.

Reliability
Indicative only.
Limitations
High error rates, especially on new generators and on edited or compressed content.
Examples
AI image classifiers; AI-text checkers

Criteria

How the techniques are evaluated

Reliability

EU AI Act · Reliability

What a result actually tells you. A marking is reliable if finding it means the content really is AI-generated, and if the check rarely errs in either direction. Absence is a separate question: it usually means nothing at all.

Security

EU AI Act · Adversarial robustness

Robustness assumes ordinary handling; security assumes an adversary. A marking that survives everyday use can still be stripped out, or forged onto content that was never AI-generated.

Robustness

EU AI Act · Robustness

Whether the marking survives ordinary handling. Content is screenshotted, cropped, re-compressed and passed through apps that rewrite files. A marking that does not survive those steps is gone by the time anyone thinks to check.

Reliability + Security

What a result means

Reliability and security together — and it splits in two. If a mark is present, does that prove the content is AI-generated? If a mark is absent, does that prove anything at all? Each answer only holds as far as the marking resists a deliberate attacker: presence is worth only as much as its resistance to forging, and absence only as much as its resistance to removal.

Can you trust a result?
TechniqueOverallHonest use, no tamperingAdversarial actor, under attack
Mark present → is it AI?Mark absent → is it real?Does a match prove AI?Can anyone check?Resists injection and forgingResists removal
Signed metadatae.g. C2PA Content CredentialsyesYes, if the signature is valid and can be trustednoProves nothing — easily strippedpartialShows who signed; trust depends on the signeryesOpen standardpartialTrust-ecosystem flaws documentednoTrivially stripped
Unsigned metadatae.g. IPTC photo metadata; China's AIGC tagnoAnyone could have added itnoProves nothing — easily strippednoAnyone can add ityesOpen standardnoAnyone can add itnoTrivially stripped
Secret-key watermarke.g. SynthIDpartialAttacks perhaps feasiblenoProves nothing — removal demonstratedyesOnly the key holder can embed itnoThe provider's tool onlyunclearInjection is claimed, not confirmednoAttacks were demonstrated
Open watermarke.g. TrustMarknoAnyone could have embedded itnoProves nothing — removablenoAnyone can embed oneyesPublic decodernoAnyone can inject one with the public encodernoRemoval model ships in the public toolkit
Fingerprinting & logginge.g. Adobe Content AuthenticitypartialThe provider's own match; depends on the fingerprintingnoOnly within the provider's coveragepartialProvider's record; depends on fingerprint qualitynoThe provider's tool onlyyesThe record is the provider'syesNothing embedded to strip
Perceptible markse.g. Meta AI's "Imagined with AI"noEasily copied onto any contentnoProves nothing — croppablenoA mark can be copied onto any contentyesPerceptible, no tools needednoEasily imitatednoCropped or painted out

Robustness

What survives common actions

Whether the marking survives ordinary handling. Content is screenshotted, cropped, re-compressed and passed through apps that rewrite files. A marking that does not survive those steps is gone by the time anyone thinks to check.

Robustness
TechniqueScreenshotCropping or editingAnalogue capture (filming a screen)Upload to a social platformSend a photo via messaging appSend a file (email, messaging app)
Signed metadatae.g. C2PA Content CredentialsnopartialDepends on the toolnopartialSee platform sectionpartialSee platform sectionyes
Unsigned metadatae.g. IPTC photo metadata; China's AIGC tagnopartialDepends on the toolnopartialSee platform sectionpartialSee platform sectionyes
Invisible watermarke.g. SynthIDyespartialMay degrade with heavy editspartialProbably notyesyesyes
Fingerprinting & logginge.g. Adobe Content AuthenticityyespartialDegrades with heavy editspartialProbably notyesyesyes
Perceptible markse.g. Meta AI's "Imagined with AI"yesnoCroppableyesyesyesyes

Verification tools

Tools available to the public

EU AI Act · Interoperability

Each tool is labeled with the marking it works with. A positive check is reliable; a negative one means little, since signals are often removed.

Metadata Watermark

Adobe C2PA Inspect

C2PA

Reads and displays a file's Content Credentials. For content registered with Adobe's Content Authenticity app, it can also recover credentials after stripping or screenshots — a watermark/fingerprint lookup in Adobe's cloud, not a signature check. Cryptographic verification is Verify's job.

Amazon Bedrock — watermark detection

Amazon watermark

Checks whether an image or video came from Amazon's models (Titan, Nova). Runs in the Amazon Bedrock console or the DetectGeneratedContent API.

c2patool

C2PA

Reads and verifies C2PA from the command line. To confirm the signer is trusted, load the official trust list once, then verify:

c2patool --settings c2pa.toml init trust
c2patool --settings c2pa.toml file.png

Content Credentials Verify

C2PA

Reads and cryptographically verifies Content Credentials: who signed the file, which AI tool was used, and the edit history. Its open-source code validates in the browser (WebAssembly), so the file need not be uploaded — though that is what the published source shows, not something we confirmed on the live site. It's open source.

ExifTool

C2PAIPTC

Reads metadata, without verification:

exiftool -a -G1 file.jpg

Gemini app — "Is this AI?"

SynthIDC2PA

Available via the Gemini chatbot interface.

Suggested prompt:

Analyze this image using your Verify AI tool to determine if it was AI-generated. Provide your detailed findings in two distinct sections: C2PA Results; SynthID Results.

OpenAI Verify

SynthIDC2PA

Checks whether an image came from OpenAI's models.

Preview / Properties

IPTC

Preview's Inspector and a file's Properties → Details show EXIF/IPTC fields. They do not read C2PA.

Supply chain

Model, system, platform

Provenance is not a property of a model, but of the whole system that generates AI content — added along the chain that carries it to you, and only at certain links in that chain.

  1. Model

    The raw capability: a weights file that turns a prompt into an image, a clip, or a voice. It has no interface and marks nothing on its own.

  2. System — the provider

    The product built around the model — interface, filters, policy — and the link where a mark is added, after generation: a metadata record, an invisible watermark, or a perceptible mark.

  3. Platform

    Where the file is shared — social apps, messaging. It reads, shows, or strips those marks.

Every measure on this page is applied at the system or the platform — after generation, not inside the model. It is also why open-weight models are not listed: a model you download and run on your own hardware or cloud instance passes through no provider, so its output comes out without marking. And a safeguard trained into an open-weight model's weights is no backstop: where safety is baked in during training, fine-tuning has been demonstrated to strip it back out.

Model providers

Measures applied by model providers

What each provider applies to its output, broken out by media type. Reported absences are referenced as well.

Provider overview
ProviderModel familySigned metadata (C2PA)Invisible watermarkPerceptible mark
OpenAI GPT-Image (ChatGPT), DALL·E (retired May 2026)yesSince Feb 2024yesSynthID, from May 2026no
Sora (app discontinued Apr 2026; API until Sep 2026)yesnoyes
Google Imagen, Nano Banana (Gemini)yesyesSynthIDyes
Veo, Gemini OmniyesyesSynthIDyes
LyriayesyesSynthIDno
Meta Muse Image (Meta AI)noWe found: An unsigned IPTC DigitalSourceType field set to trainedAlgorithmicMedia.Unsigned IPTC onlyyesContent Seal, from Jul 2026no
Muse Video (preview)nonono
Adobe Firefly Imageyesnono
Firefly VideounclearPublications refer to image onlynono
Amazon (AWS) Titan Image, Nova CanvasyesyesAmazon proprietaryno
Nova Reelyes1.1+ onlyyesAmazon proprietaryno
xAI Grok Imagine ImagenoWe found: A base64 “Signature:” blob in ImageDescription, repeated in UserComment, and a per-image UUID in Artist.Unsigned metadata onlynounclear
Grok Imagine VideonoWe found: A base64 “Signature:” blob in the QuickTime Comment field. No Artist field.Unsigned metadata onlynounclear
ElevenLabs Text-to-speech, voice, musicpartialMusic API only, off by defaultpartialSynthID, free tier from Jun 2026no
Midjourney Image V8.1noWe found: An unsigned IPTC DigitalSourceType field set to trainedAlgorithmicMedia.Unsigned IPTC onlynono
Video V1nonono
Black Forest Labs FLUX.2partialPro API onlyunclearMentioned as optional in the open-weights Dev repositoryunclearNot mentioned in BFL's docs
Runway Gen-4, Gen-4.5yesunclearMentioned in 2024, but not in current safety pagepartialFree tier only
Kling (Kuaishou) Kling 3.0noUnsigned metadata onlynopartialFree tier only

Platforms

How platforms handle provenance signals

Platforms generally read provenance metadata at upload and remove it from the files they serve, so labels exist only within each platform. This table judges the distribution role only — what a platform does to files that pass through it. Where the same company builds generation features into the app (Veo clips in YouTube Shorts, Meta AI in WhatsApp), the marks on that output are a provider role, covered above.

Platform overview
PlatformReads provenanceMetadata still readableLabel shown to viewersLets posters flag AI
Facebook / Instagram / ThreadsMeta platformsunclearClaims C2PA + IPTC; Instagram audit saw IPTC onlyunclearLegacy metadata stripped (2019 test, pre-C2PA)yes“AI info”yesToggle; required for realistic AI
TikTokunclearClaimed since 2024; audits see little effectunclearWe found: A Sora 2 video posted directly by OpenAI’s own TikTok account — captioned as Sora output — contained no C2PA manifest after download, and showed signs of re-encoding, despite TikTok’s claim that credentials remain on downloaded content.“Survives download” claimed; none foundyes“AI-generated”yesToggle; required for realistic AI
YouTubeunclearInconsistent behaviornoWe found: A video that YouTube itself labels “Captured with a camera” — proof a valid C2PA manifest arrived with the upload — is served with no manifest at all: the original gone, none re-attached. The provenance survives only as YouTube’s label.Stripped on re-encodeyes“Made with AI”yesToggle; required for realistic AI
X (Twitter)unclearProbably inconsistentnoWe found: Images from ChatGPT and Gemini, posted to X by OpenAI’s and Google’s own accounts, all came back with no C2PA and no metadata — though both providers’ images otherwise carry it.Strips metadatayes“Made with AI”; “Manipulated media” announced, unconfirmedyesToggle; required for monetized armed-conflict video, India
WhatsAppnonoStripped as photonono
TelegramnoWe found: No trace of C2PA, Content Credentials, SynthID, or any AI-labeling feature anywhere in the open-source code of Telegram’s official apps.noWe found: In Telegram's open-source code, the photo path rebuilds each sent image from decoded pixels, leaving every kind of embedded metadata behind — EXIF, IPTC and C2PA manifests alike. Telegram's own docs don't mention it.Stripped on re-encodenoWe found: No trace of C2PA, Content Credentials, SynthID, or any AI-labeling feature anywhere in the open-source code of Telegram’s official apps.noWe found: No trace of C2PA, Content Credentials, SynthID, or any AI-labeling feature anywhere in the open-source code of Telegram’s official apps.
SignalnoWe found: No trace of C2PA, Content Credentials, SynthID, or any AI-disclosure feature anywhere in Signal’s open-source client code.noWe found: In Signal's open-source code, the image path rebuilds each sent photo from decoded pixels, leaving every kind of embedded metadata behind — EXIF (which Signal's own note names), plus IPTC and C2PA manifests.Stripped by designnoWe found: No trace of C2PA, Content Credentials, SynthID, or any AI-disclosure feature anywhere in Signal’s open-source client code.noWe found: No trace of C2PA, Content Credentials, SynthID, or any AI-disclosure feature anywhere in Signal’s open-source client code.