Which marking methods AI providers use, how platforms handle them, and what tools exist to check content — for images, video, and audio, not text. The framework of marking techniques follows the EU Code of Practice on the transparency of AI-generated content, grounded here in the technologies actually deployed today. Based on public information, with sources linked throughout.
None of this tells you whether the content is true — whether what it shows actually happened, or represents reality accurately. These are provenance measures: when they work, they show how a piece of content was produced — and, sometimes, by whom.
Methods
Marking techniques
Each technique marks or records content in a different way — with different reliability, and different ways to defeat it.
Metadata
A record attached to the file: who made it, with which tool, and when. It can be cryptographically signed or unsigned.
Reliability
Signed: a valid and trusted signature is reliable evidence. Unsigned: anyone can edit it.
Limitations
Removed by screenshots, re-encoding, and upload to most social platforms.
Examples
C2PA Content Credentials (signed); SEAL (signed); IPTC photo metadata (unsigned); China's AIGC tag (unsigned; GB 45438-2025)
Invisible watermark
A pattern embedded in the pixels or audio itself, imperceptible to people. It can be secret-key (only the provider's tool can read it) or open (anyone can read it with a published decoder).
Reliability
Secret-key: reliable when the provider's tool finds it. Open: anyone can embed one, so a read is a pointer to a registry — trust comes from the signed record it looks up.
Limitations
Secret-key: verification only through the provider. Open: public tools can forge or remove it. Removal attacks exist for both.
The provider computes a fingerprint — a compact perceptual hash of the content, not a copy of it — and keeps a record, so content can be matched back later even without metadata.
Reliability
A match is the provider's own record of generation.
Limitations
Only the provider can run the lookup.
Examples
Adobe Content Authenticity; OpenAI's Sora internal reverse search
Perceptible marks
A mark placed on the content itself at generation — a logo burned into the corner of an image or video, or an audible tone or spoken disclaimer at the start of a clip.
Reliability
Perceptible to anyone, without tools.
Limitations
Can be cropped or trimmed out, or added to any content with simple editing; several services remove them on paid plans.
Examples
Gemini's corner mark (removed only on the Ultra tier and via AI Studio/API)
Forensic detection
Estimating whether content is AI-generated from statistical patterns that the generation process leaves in the content — no embedded signal involved.
Reliability
Indicative only.
Limitations
High error rates, especially on new generators and on edited or compressed content.
Examples
AI image classifiers; AI-text checkers
Criteria
How the techniques are evaluated
Reliability
EU AI Act · Reliability
What a result actually tells you. A marking is reliable if finding it means the content really is AI-generated, and if the check rarely errs in either direction. Absence is a separate question: it usually means nothing at all.
Security
EU AI Act · Adversarial robustness
Robustness assumes ordinary handling; security assumes an adversary. A marking that survives everyday use can still be stripped out, or forged onto content that was never AI-generated.
Robustness
EU AI Act · Robustness
Whether the marking survives ordinary handling. Content is screenshotted, cropped, re-compressed and passed through apps that rewrite files. A marking that does not survive those steps is gone by the time anyone thinks to check.
Reliability + Security
What a result means
Reliability and security together — and it splits in two. If a mark is present, does that prove the content is AI-generated? If a mark is absent, does that prove anything at all? Each answer only holds as far as the marking resists a deliberate attacker: presence is worth only as much as its resistance to forging, and absence only as much as its resistance to removal.
Can you trust a result?
Technique
Overall
Honest use, no tampering
Adversarial actor, under attack
Mark present → is it AI?
Mark absent → is it real?
Does a match prove AI?
Can anyone check?
Resists injection and forging
Resists removal
Signed metadatae.g. C2PA Content Credentials
yesYes, if the signature is valid and can be trusted
noProves nothing — easily stripped
partialShows who signed; trust depends on the signer
yesOpen standard
partialTrust-ecosystem flaws documented
noTrivially stripped
Unsigned metadatae.g. IPTC photo metadata; China's AIGC tag
partialThe provider's own match; depends on the fingerprinting
noOnly within the provider's coverage
partialProvider's record; depends on fingerprint quality
noThe provider's tool only
yesThe record is the provider's
yesNothing embedded to strip
Perceptible markse.g. Meta AI's "Imagined with AI"
noEasily copied onto any content
noProves nothing — croppable
noA mark can be copied onto any content
yesPerceptible, no tools needed
noEasily imitated
noCropped or painted out
Robustness
What survives common actions
Whether the marking survives ordinary handling. Content is screenshotted, cropped, re-compressed and passed through apps that rewrite files. A marking that does not survive those steps is gone by the time anyone thinks to check.
Robustness
Technique
Screenshot
Cropping or editing
Analogue capture (filming a screen)
Upload to a social platform
Send a photo via messaging app
Send a file (email, messaging app)
Signed metadatae.g. C2PA Content Credentials
no
partialDepends on the tool
no
partialSee platform section
partialSee platform section
yes
Unsigned metadatae.g. IPTC photo metadata; China's AIGC tag
Reads and displays a file's Content Credentials. For content registered with Adobe's Content Authenticity app, it can also recover credentials after stripping or screenshots — a watermark/fingerprint lookup in Adobe's cloud, not a signature check. Cryptographic verification is Verify's job.
Reads and cryptographically verifies Content Credentials: who signed the file, which AI tool was used, and the edit history. Its open-source code validates in the browser (WebAssembly), so the file need not be uploaded — though that is what the published source shows, not something we confirmed on the live site. It's open source.
Analyze this image using your Verify AI tool to determine if it was AI-generated. Provide your detailed findings in two distinct sections: C2PA Results; SynthID Results.
Access requires an application; not open to the general public.
Supply chain
Model, system, platform
Provenance is not a property of a model, but of the whole system that generates AI content — added along the chain that carries it to you, and only at certain links in that chain.
Model
The raw capability: a weights file that turns a prompt into an image, a clip, or a voice. It has no interface and marks nothing on its own.
System — the provider
The product built around the model — interface, filters, policy — and the link where a mark is added, after generation: a metadata record, an invisible watermark, or a perceptible mark.
Platform
Where the file is shared — social apps, messaging. It reads, shows, or strips those marks.
Every measure on this page is applied at the system or the platform — after generation, not inside the model. It is also why open-weight models are not listed: a model you download and run on your own hardware or cloud instance passes through no provider, so its output comes out without marking. And a safeguard trained into an open-weight model's weights is no backstop: where safety is baked in during training, fine-tuning has been demonstrated to strip it back out.
Model providers
Measures applied by model providers
What each provider applies to its output, broken out by media type. Reported absences are referenced as well.
Provider overview
Provider
Model family
Signed metadata (C2PA)
Invisible watermark
Perceptible mark
OpenAI
GPT-Image (ChatGPT), DALL·E (retired May 2026)
yesSince Feb 2024
yesSynthID, from May 2026
no
Sora (app discontinued Apr 2026; API until Sep 2026)
yes
no
yes
Google
Imagen, Nano Banana (Gemini)
yes
yesSynthID
yes
Veo, Gemini Omni
yes
yesSynthID
yes
Lyria
yes
yesSynthID
no
Meta
Muse Image (Meta AI)
noWe found: An unsigned IPTC DigitalSourceType field set to trainedAlgorithmicMedia.Unsigned IPTC only
yesContent Seal, from Jul 2026
no
Muse Video (preview)
no
no
no
Adobe
Firefly Image
yes
no
no
Firefly Video
unclearPublications refer to image only
no
no
Amazon (AWS)
Titan Image, Nova Canvas
yes
yesAmazon proprietary
no
Nova Reel
yes1.1+ only
yesAmazon proprietary
no
xAI
Grok Imagine Image
noWe found: A base64 “Signature:” blob in ImageDescription, repeated in UserComment, and a per-image UUID in Artist.Unsigned metadata only
no
unclear
Grok Imagine Video
noWe found: A base64 “Signature:” blob in the QuickTime Comment field. No Artist field.Unsigned metadata only
no
unclear
ElevenLabs
Text-to-speech, voice, music
partialMusic API only, off by default
partialSynthID, free tier from Jun 2026
no
Midjourney
Image V8.1
noWe found: An unsigned IPTC DigitalSourceType field set to trainedAlgorithmicMedia.Unsigned IPTC only
no
no
Video V1
no
no
no
Black Forest Labs
FLUX.2
partialPro API only
unclearMentioned as optional in the open-weights Dev repository
unclearNot mentioned in BFL's docs
Runway
Gen-4, Gen-4.5
yes
unclearMentioned in 2024, but not in current safety page
partialFree tier only
Kling (Kuaishou)
Kling 3.0
noUnsigned metadata only
no
partialFree tier only
Platforms
How platforms handle provenance signals
Platforms generally read provenance metadata at upload and remove it from the files they serve, so labels exist only within each platform. This table judges the distribution role only — what a platform does to files that pass through it. Where the same company builds generation features into the app (Veo clips in YouTube Shorts, Meta AI in WhatsApp), the marks on that output are a provider role, covered above.
Platform overview
Platform
Reads provenance
Metadata still readable
Label shown to viewers
Lets posters flag AI
Facebook / Instagram / ThreadsMeta platforms
unclearClaims C2PA + IPTC; Instagram audit saw IPTC only
unclearClaimed since 2024; audits see little effect
unclearWe found: A Sora 2 video posted directly by OpenAI’s own TikTok account — captioned as Sora output — contained no C2PA manifest after download, and showed signs of re-encoding, despite TikTok’s claim that credentials remain on downloaded content.“Survives download” claimed; none found
yes“AI-generated”
yesToggle; required for realistic AI
YouTube
unclearInconsistent behavior
noWe found: A video that YouTube itself labels “Captured with a camera” — proof a valid C2PA manifest arrived with the upload — is served with no manifest at all: the original gone, none re-attached. The provenance survives only as YouTube’s label.Stripped on re-encode
yes“Made with AI”
yesToggle; required for realistic AI
X (Twitter)
unclearProbably inconsistent
noWe found: Images from ChatGPT and Gemini, posted to X by OpenAI’s and Google’s own accounts, all came back with no C2PA and no metadata — though both providers’ images otherwise carry it.Strips metadata
yes“Made with AI”; “Manipulated media” announced, unconfirmed
yesToggle; required for monetized armed-conflict video, India
WhatsApp
no
noStripped as photo
no
no
Telegram
noWe found: No trace of C2PA, Content Credentials, SynthID, or any AI-labeling feature anywhere in the open-source code of Telegram’s official apps.
noWe found: In Telegram's open-source code, the photo path rebuilds each sent image from decoded pixels, leaving every kind of embedded metadata behind — EXIF, IPTC and C2PA manifests alike. Telegram's own docs don't mention it.Stripped on re-encode
noWe found: No trace of C2PA, Content Credentials, SynthID, or any AI-labeling feature anywhere in the open-source code of Telegram’s official apps.
noWe found: No trace of C2PA, Content Credentials, SynthID, or any AI-labeling feature anywhere in the open-source code of Telegram’s official apps.
Signal
noWe found: No trace of C2PA, Content Credentials, SynthID, or any AI-disclosure feature anywhere in Signal’s open-source client code.
noWe found: In Signal's open-source code, the image path rebuilds each sent photo from decoded pixels, leaving every kind of embedded metadata behind — EXIF (which Signal's own note names), plus IPTC and C2PA manifests.Stripped by design
noWe found: No trace of C2PA, Content Credentials, SynthID, or any AI-disclosure feature anywhere in Signal’s open-source client code.
noWe found: No trace of C2PA, Content Credentials, SynthID, or any AI-disclosure feature anywhere in Signal’s open-source client code.